By: MARY CHIN AND JAMES SARDA (DE)
DR BOB REECE, 70, is Emeritus Professor in History at Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia, and has a long connection with Borneo. He first came to Sabah as a young journalist for the Far Eastern Economic Review in July 1968. His later articles on the political situation in Sabah did not endear him to the late Tun Mustapha and his supporters.
He subsequently wrote his doctoral dessertation at the Australian National University on the 1946 cession of Sarawak to Britain by Rajah Charles Vyner Brooke and went on to publish extensively on Sarawak's history under the White Rajahs. Today he is one of the foremost authorities on the history of what used to be known as ‘British Borneo’.
He is based in Perth and on a recent trip to Sabah, talked to Daily Express Special Writer Mary Chin and Chief Editor James Sarda about his observations and experiences in Sabah and Sarawak.
Following is the second part of the interview. The first appeared last week.
DE: The idea of a single-party dominance is being challenged now, especially after the 2008 elections, and emergence of younger Malaysians wanting their space that saw the two-third majority becoming a casualty.
You said you observed back in the late 1960s that except in the peninsula where the Malays were united, it wasn't so in the Bornean states.
Dr Bob: Well, it used to be and as long as Umno had a two-thirds majority in the Dewan Rakyat, they could change the Constitution and put things under their control. But in Sarawak, the Malays were split, had been split since 1946. The division (was) between those who wanted the Brookes back and those who wanted to accept colonial rule, so the anti-cession people versus the pro-cession people.
There was a bitter, bitter divide between those two camps.
As a result, you never had one strong Malay political party in Sarawak.
That was really a vital fact. Because of this, one bunch of Malays had to ally themselves with other parties and the other likewise, so there was an alliance coalition with Datuk Bandar's Party, Parti Panas (Parti Nasional Sarawak). So, there was Parti Panas which represented the people who wanted colonial status because it was argued that they would get more from the British than the Brookes.
Colonial rule would be an advance, better infrastructure, more expenditure, etc. So Panas allied itself with the Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA). Hence, you had SCA, Panas and another Parti Pesaka.
DE: You are talking about 1969 and this was well after Independence (through Malaysia in 1963). Are you saying this longing for the past was still there?
Dr Bob: These feelings, this split in the Malay community was still very bitter. It split families (politically), brothers and sisters, sons and fathers.
DE: There was still a lot of nostalgia?
Dr Bob: Bitterness more than nostalgia. As a result, they remained in the Malay community right through Sarawak, remained split, particularly in Kuching, Sibu. The result was we had one coalition, the Alliance consisting of Parti Panas and Sarawak Chinese Association and Parti Pesaka which was (Tun) Jugah's party. Jugah was the leader of the Ibans.
It's a pity he only picked up a certain amount of Iban support.
On the other side ranged against them was an opposition Malay Party which I can't remember the name now which allied themselves with Ningkan, SNAP and the CPP. But what really dictated at all was the split in the Malays whereas in Kuala Lumpur, the Malays were solid.
And it resulted in a much more complex political set of arrangements In Sarawak.
DE: You said the Malays were still very favourable to the Brookes in Sarawak but in Sabah, leaders like Mustapha were determined the whites should leave. Why do you think there was this difference in perception of the Malays towards colonial rule in the two Borneo states? Is it because the Brookes took care of the Malays better?
Dr Bob: Well, they took care of a certain class, they took care of the more traditional class.
The circle Perambangan, the circle Datuk, Datuk, Abang, Abang. The Malays who benefited from the Brookes were more the pure elites, pure hereditary elites and their supporters whereas the people who didn't benefit so much were the younger commoner, non-aristocratic Malays.
So you had a division there between loyalists, I suppose, to the Brookes and people who were looking for something different.
But even in the anti-cession movement, there was a split between the Brooke loyalists who thought they'd get something out of staying with the Brookes or they had always benefited and the younger Malay English educated who saw Independence as being retained by the Brookes until such time as they could take over the Brookes could keep the bed warm until they could jump in and take over. In other words, the Brookes were a short-term guarantee of the retention of Independence.
If the Brookes stayed, they could be kicked out eventually, but in the meantime, I mean the Brits could make Sarawak a colony.
They were wanting a repeal of cession, bring back the Brookes and this would guarantee independence and that independence could be used for some other purpose later. They could kick out the Brookes, they could have something like Indonesia, they could have something like Malaysia.
So to put it very briefly, the reason why Sarawak is so different politically and so much more complex is that the racial ethnic blocs that existed in Semenanjung weren't so simply defined in Sarawak.
They were more complicated, so there had to be multi-racial parties and these multi-racial parties had to do deals. SCA was predominantly Chinese but they had Iban supporters, they had Malay supporters.
Likewise, Berjasa, basically a Malay party with some Iban support, some Chinese support and then there was SUPP. Each of the Opposition parties had some multi-racial membership across the board and they were making a point of being multi-racial in order to attract as much supporters as they could.
Whereas the pattern in KL was each party went through its own ethnic constituency, Umno for the Malays, MCA for the Chinese, the Indian party MIC. But the pattern in Sarawak was much more complex. I haven't really kept up with Sabah politics since Berjaya.
DE: During the time you were in Sabah, what actually got you into the wrong books? Was it something you wrote about Mustapha?
Dr Bob: Yes, I wrote about, well, you know, so long ago, I can't even recall what I wrote (laughs). I mean like a journalist, I was critical of him.
DE: Wasn't it along the lines of Sabah being a ‘one-man democracy’?
Dr Bob: Yes, I mean he was a very dominant force and he was using pressure on people and money on people as I recall but the details I completely forgot. I will have to refresh myself on what I was saying at that time.
DE: So, what exactly were you touching on?
Dr Bob: I think one of the things I was criticising, I suppose, was the way in which people from the Southern Philippines were being allowed to
DE: Enter Sabah?
Dr Bob: Not just enter Sabah but given Permanent Residence (PR) status, something called a 'white' citizenship. In other words, Mustapha was boosting what he might call his Malay support group.
DE: You mean even in 1968 there was this process as you saw it?
Dr Bob: Starting it was 1969 and 1970, just starting. There was a lot of discussion about, a lot of protest about the way in which these people were allowed to come in and stay on with red cards.
DE: And where were these protests?
Dr Bob: People that I spoke toÉwho were not Malays.
DE: From Stephens' Upko or from the Chinese?
Dr Bob: Well, I suppose both from Upko and the Chinese. I can't recall who said these things to me. It's just too long ago.
I've got one notebook so I suppose I can go back to it and find out who I spoke to. But I met (late Datuk Peter) Mojuntin, I met (Tan Sri) Peter Lo, one or two other Chinese politicians, anybody who was around basically.
DE: When this article came out, you were still here or back in KL.
Dr Bob: I was back in KL.
DE: Were you made a persona non-grata in the State by Mustapha?
Dr Bob: They didn't ban me. But I didn't try to come back. As I explained, after writing those articles, I had a job in Singapore, so I wasn't travelling and I didn't really come back to Sabah for some years after. Hence, I didn't keep up a permanent kind of surveillance on what was going on in Sabah.
DE: Did you manage to interview Mustapha since you were critical of his administration style?
Dr Bob: (sighs) no, I met him. I didn't interview him.
But I met Donald Stephens at different times. I suppose the people I met were more in the Upko camp and more the Chinese Party.
DE: At that time were you aware of the tension that was going on between these two?
Dr Bob: Between Mustapha and Stephens? Yes, I was aware of thatÉyou are asking me to remember things a long time ago and I haven't read those articles for years. So I got to go back and refresh my mind on who I spoke to.
DE: You did a couple of special reports on Sabah.
Dr Bob: Yes, two or three. When nobody else was taking much interest in Sabah. I mean a lot of what was going on here was unreported.
DE: There was hardly anything that would interest the outside world.
Dr Bob: It wasn't much outside world interest. I mean maybe there is not still. Maybe, you know, it is pretty hard to project Sabah politics into
DE: What was your impression about Sabah then?
Dr Bob: Well, it was pretty laid back. A very easy-going place but I didn't get very far beyond KK. I went across to Sandakan and I went up to Ranau.
I climbed the mountain and.
DE: Is this present trip (to launch the book on Macaskie) your first trip in many years?
Dr Bob: I was back here a few years ago for a history conference five years ago where I talked about the Japanese Occupation and I did a book on the ‘Masa Jepun’ but that's more about Sarawak.
It (history conference paper) was more about the Japanese in Sarawak although I was looking at the policy and strategies of the Japanese in North Borneo, too.
And I briefly described the Double Tenth Rebellion, briefly.
DE: In your encounter with Stephens, did he tell you about some of his grievances or what he was unhappy about?
Dr Bob: I met him once or twice. I really couldn't recall. He may have. I met him again when I was writing my PhD in Canberra in 1973.
That was the last year of his High Commissioner-ship and he had some parties at the High Commission in Canberra.
I went to those and met him again but the only thing he did do at one point when I was kicked out of Singapore, I was thinking of taking legal action against Lee Kuan Yew because there was a statement published in the Straits Times which was libellous.
I was thinking of taking the Straits Times to court for publishing something defamatory and Stephens said he would back that legal challenge. When it came to a point, we dropped it because we didn't see any future. But I think he was fed up with Lee. I think he wanted to have some revenge on Lee for playing him out. I think, you know, he had a lot to do with Lee's negotiations for Malaysia.
But when Lee got out of the Federation (1965), there was a strong feeling among the people in Sarawak and Sabah that the Federation was no longer viable. If Singapore goes out, why should we stay and Stephens felt like that but maybe he didn't get much support from Kuan Yew, I don't know.
DE: It was not just the lack of support but, perhaps, also because by then Stephens was viewed as not being consistent in whatever he was struggling for. There was a credibility issue.
Dr Bob: Possibly.
DE: He promised a lot of things to a lot of people. Like the time he said he was against the Malaysia proposal and then made a 360 degree turnaround.
The CM at the time of the Separation, Tan Sri Peter Lo, said Stephens came one day to him in tears because he was replaced as CM and told him (Lo) to convince Tunku to give him back the post (CM), to which Lo told him that he would be willing only if he can guarantee Lo that it will be him who will be sitting on the chair and not someone else.
And again after the Separation, Lo said he was approached to back Stephens in his campaign to review the Malaysia Agreement but Lo stood his ground. At that point, Lo realled Stephens' surprise insistence on entering Malaysia without safeguards which terrified Lo and some colleagues, including colonial officers, to come up with the 20 Points safeguards as a contingency measure.
He continued to display these inconsistencies even after the merger whenever things were not going the way he wanted.
Such as when he decided to close Upko (party of the non-Muslim natives) despite strong objection from grassroots when his timber licence and that of the Paper (Sabah Times) was at Mustapha's mercy.
His call for all of them to join Mustapha's Usno confused his supporters because Usno primarily served the Muslim natives whereas Sabah's political process started with non-Muslim native (Upko), Muslim native (Usno) and Chinese (SCA) participation on equal basis.
Lo said to Daily Express in an interview that if he had supported Stephens in his campaign to review the Malaysia Agreement following the pullout of Singapore, one of two things could have happened.
Firstly, Kuala Lumpur would never again trust the Sabah Chinese and secondly there was no telling whether Stephens may once again change his mind for whatever reason, leaving the Chinese at a great disadvantage.
Dr Bob: Well, I think Stephens was under colossal pressure.
I think KL was exerting a lot of pressure. The Brits were exerting pressure, so that was why Stephens cracked. And I think the big factor was the British pressure along the lines of, well, 'if you go your way, that's fine but we won't protect you. We will only give you military protection against the Indonesians on the basis if you join Malaysia and Malaysian protection'. And at that point, things were blowing up in Indonesia.
There were Rambos and threats and things didn't look good so people like Stephens would be a bit nervous about that.
…..More next week.
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