By : SELVARAJA SOMIAH
EVEN before the May polls
campaign process has reached full momentum in the state of Sabah, three
generalisations dominate the marketplace of political ideas about its
consequences:
a) that a third-time victory
for chief minister Musa Aman in Sabah is nearly certain;
b) since this victory is a
foregone conclusion, the time is ripe for a bigger role for Musa Aman
and
c) this victory is likely to
be a direct outcome of ‘good governance’, understood primarily as robust
economic growth, delivered under Musa’s leadership.
I see this approach as
problematic for two reasons: in terms of method, it seems that QED has been
etched in even before one could see the proof of what one set out to examine.
More importantly, however, there is a certain naivete in this formulation that
leads us to a complacence in examining the very complicated and nuanced role of
electoral competition currently being witnessed in this state. I engage myself
with unravelling this second strand, as viewed in the terrain of practical
politics, analysing the strategies and counter-strategies of the main
contenders—the ruling BN/UMNO the Pakatan Rakyat the Star Sabah and Sabah
Progressive Party (SAPP). I then examine the robustness of each of these three
‘generalisations’, and in conclusion argue that although it is an advantage to
Musa Aman, there is political competition to be witnessed before one could
declare the match won.
For one, the Pakatan Rakyat
Sabah in the field does not have a sense of local issues, an understanding of
pockets of disadvantage, and also a macro-strategy of where to deploy its
energies spatially. In not associating themselves with Sabahan struggles against
Malayan colonisation, the party has been aligning itself on the wrong side of
popular grievances. Anwar Ibrahim’s campaigns will be of disadvantage, given
his historical roots in the toppling of the duly elected PBS government in 1994
and his hands together with Dr Mahathir’s in the Project IC to dilute the
native population in the state. Also Pakatan’s lineup, who is going to be chief
minister if they win? Lajim as chief minister? Bumburing? Tamrin? Ansari? Who?
They have no one of Musa Aman’s standing and Musa’s record of governance the
last ten years can speak for itself.
For the SAPP the party’s
grassroots base was not evident even in the Batu Sapi parliamentary
by-elections held on 2010. Besides, the SAPP had a low vote-share of 10 per
cent or less even in the March 2008 elections. This will not be translated
evenly into enough seats for the party this coming GE 13th May 5. Also, the
margins of losing are very low. The party’s President, Yong Teck Lee failure to
win over Pakatan’s Ansari in the Batu Sapi parliamentary by elections means
even the Chinese in Sandakan have rejected the SAPP. SAPP’s most impressive
pre-poll offering has been its “Autonomi for Sabah” battle cry, promising new
Sabah IC for Sabahans if it comes to power, is questionable because they have
been in the BN government for 14 years and Yong Teck Lee had been chief
minister of Sabah for 2 years yet did not do zilch.
Part of the Star Sabah
strategy is to focus on the interiors of Sabah, Jeffrey Kitingan’s roost, where
it is said that the natives are disgruntled. As a macro-strategy, the Star
Sabah is concentrating on the interiors of Sabah, where natives who are farmers
have been adversely hit by high prices of fertilizers and agrochemicals and
cost of essentials rocketing sky high The region accounts for nearly a third of
the total seats and is the stronghold of PBS supremo Datuk Joseph Pairin
Kitingan the “Huguan Siou”or paramount chief of the Kadazandusun Murut
community, the backbone of UMNO Sabah. There is a story about Pairin saying his
bids this time is his last battle to retain both constituencies of Keningau and
Tambunan for the Barisan Nasional in the interest of the people, meaning
Jeffrey will have a tough time to win in Keningau. Besides, there is no tacit
approval by Pairin to the natives that Jeffrey will takeover from Pairin, as
claimed. As an unfolding of this macro-strategy, Jeffrey might launch the Star
Sabah’s manifesto for the May polls’s in Keningau, in the heart of Indigenous
Sabah.
Also, the Najib government’s
decision to get The Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) on Illegal Immigrants in
Sabah is of recent vintage, and can win favours for the BN. Natives
disgruntlement owing to disadvantages due to the presence of huge numbers of
illegals becoming instant Malaysians and Bumiputras. Najib and the Federal
Government seriously addressing it by having the RCI on illegals, along with
the Lahad Datu drama, makes for a strong force. After all, the defeat of Haris
Salleh in 1985‘ was scripted similarly, combining agricultural disgruntlement
and fear of illegals reverse taking over of Sabah and sentiments of regional
disadvantage.
To the advantage of the
Barisan National is the fact that there is no state-wide anti-incumbency even
after a decade-long rule by Musa Aman. Economic indicators are certainly
robust, with state GDP growth rates averaging 6 to 7 per cent or more (between
2003-12). Interestingly, Musa Aman has raised it to a campaign pitch, telling
everyone to “learn” from the Sabah growth story. The sectoral composition of
this growth rate, particularly the advances in construction, agriculture and
tourism, have received wide attention. Although there have been disputes
whether the growth has been as high as Musa Aman claims, even modest estimates
available accept agriculture grew at higher than national average at around ten
per cent or more. Economists also note the significance of the consistently
high growth rate in the agriculture, construction and the tourism sector,
notwithstanding the constraints it faces.
But electoral competition,
and even more electoral victories, are not simple outcomes of people
calculating the benefits of policies and voting for political leaders who set
the regional economy right. Were this hypothesis correct, why would Premier
Najib Tun Razak have announced a series of cash incentives a year before the
May poll dates set in? These include promises of farm loan and free internet
usage, electricity bill waivers, enhanced allowances to security personals and
civil servants, allowances for youth earning less than RM2000 and payment of
arrears to teachers among others and the BR1M and many more goodies. Even the
kampong headman has been promised a increase in allowances. The cash transfers
build a new constituency of supporters, while countering some of the opposition
from the lower bureaucracy and the poor. Advantage to Musa Aman again.
Of greater bearing for
electoral fortunes is Musa Aman’s use of political vocabulary and tailoring the
campaign language to hype his achievements and castigate the opposition. In
state wide ceramahs, the opposition are his target, as if the party’s state
unit led by Lajim Hj Okim, Wilfred Bumburing, Dr Jeffrey Kitingan and Anwar
Ibrahim has no bearing. To malign the image further, Musa Aman adds that the “Pakatan
Rakyat and the local opposition is not united and cannot really be trusted.”
Coming back to the three
generalisations I began with, it is the first of which the chances seem highly
likely. But Musa Aman’s victory is unlikely to be attained without competition
from the local unit of the opposition front. The opposition front has also made
pro-poor election promises of housing and employment for the poor, reduction of
petrol prices, abolition of PTPTN and Sabah rights. How well they are able to
sustain these as campaign issues, and combine their attack along with the
challenges from UMNO dissidents, may have very little implications for this
election.
The second generalisation
about “a bigger role for Musa Aman” for the moment seems to be a ploy to hype
the leader into a “larger than real” stature, and is certainly a political
statement intended for local Sabah consumption. Finally, robust growth
notwithstanding, Musa is not relying on these laurels alone. So also the
opposition, which has understood that growth pursued in a certain way produces
grievances amongst the displaced and the rural poor, and these can be woven
into a counter-campaign strategy. In conclusion, it is advantage Musa Aman, but
the battle is yet to be fought.
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